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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
This paper  explores  the  relationship  between  natural  resource  revenues  and  expenditure  decentraliza-
tion.  While  the  literature  suggests  that  an  abundance  of natural  resources  may  have  deleterious  effects  on
fiscal  decentralization  and  other variables,  existing  empirical  evidence  regarding  expenditure  decentral-
ization  is  scant  and suspect.  We  find  that expenditure  decentralization  is  highly  persistent.  We  take  this
persistence  into  account  and  use  four  different  estimation  strategies  to  examine  whether  natural  resource
revenues  influence  expenditure  decentralization.  Increases  in  natural  resource  rents  as  a percentage  of
Gross Domestic  Product  (GDP)  statistically  significantly  and  negatively  affect  expenditure  decentraliza-
tion.  A 1%  year-on-year  increase  in  natural  resource  rents  reduces  estimated  expenditure  decentralization





findings  strongly  suggest  that  increases  in resource  endowments  lead to  a centralization  of  government
expenditures.
Published  by Elsevier  Inc.  on behalf  of Board  of  Trustees  of  the  University  of  Illinois.SDVC
. Introduction
Often religious, ethnic, and resulting nationalist sentiments
orm the narrative of the rationale for separatist movements dur-
ng civil wars. Many of these separatist conflicts, however, occur in
atural resource rich regions, suggesting that greed, not grievance,
otivates calls for greater autonomy and, in extreme cases, sep-
ration. Even resurgent nationalism in Scotland, beginning in the
970 s, appears to be driven by the discovery of oil in 1966 even
hough claims to the rich oil reserves of the North Sea are doubtful.
atural resource wealth creates political conflict and may  lead to
emands for greater subnational autonomy, secession, and, in some
ases, armed separatist movements (Ross, 2004, 2015; Le Billon,
001). Whether subnational governments should, by geographical
oincidence, enjoy the rents from natural resource endowments
as generated significant debate in the literature and practice. The
resence of natural resource endowments may  alter the relation-
hip between central and subnational governments; a relationship
hat we explore in this paper.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: larmey@nps.edu (L.E. Armey), rmcnab@odu.edu
R.M. McNab).
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2018.05.015
062-9769/Published by Elsevier Inc. on behalf of Board of Trustees of the University of IlThis paper examines whether natural resource rents influence
expenditure decentralization. As natural resource rents increase,
central governments may  choose to capture these rents and equal-
ize expenditures across subnational regions. From this perspective,
central governments would attempt to use these rents to amelio-
rate separatist tensions, increasing decentralization as a strategy to
avoid conflict. On the other hand, central governments may  attempt
to capture these rents for more nefarious reasons, to including
rent-seeking behavior and outright theft. While the literature has
largely focused on rents and the distribution of revenues (Acemoglu
& Robinson, 2006; Auty, 2001, 2004; Ross, 2004; Perez-Sebastian
& Raveh, 2016a,b), we  instead focus on whether natural resource
rents influence expenditure decentralization.
As expenditure decentralization is highly persistent, we discuss
how spurious regressions may  result if one fails to account for this
persistency. We compare static and dynamic models of the deter-
minants of expenditure decentralization as a strategy to examine
the robustness of our empirical results. We find that increases in
natural resource rents as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) significantly and negatively affect expenditure decentraliza-
tion. A 1% year-on-year increase in natural resource rents results
in a 0.1% to 0.3% year-on-year decrease in expenditure decentral-
ization. As a robustness check, we  also find that natural resource
exports negatively and significantly affect expenditure decentral-
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eed to account for the persistency of expenditure decentraliza-
ion and estimating the negative impact of natural resource rents
n expenditure decentralization.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next
ection, we briefly review the literature and develop the testable
ypotheses of interest. We  then discuss the data. The fourth section
iscusses the econometric strategy. The fifth section discusses the
conometric tests and presents the results of our analysis. The last
ection concludes and offers recommendations for future research.
. A brief review of the literature
The resource curse literature credits natural resource abun-
ance with all manner of struggles in developing countries.
ountries who depend on natural-resource trade suffer from
lower economic growth (Sachs & Warner, 1997, 1999). Natu-
al resource abundant countries may  experience lower rates of
conomic growth due to Dutch disease; rent-seeking behavior,
verconfidence, and lack of investment in human capital (Collier,
oeffer, & Rohner, 2009; Gylfason, 2001). The literature suggests,
n addition to Dutch disease, there may  be pervasive institu-
ional factors. Relative resource rich countries may  increase public
xpenditures and subsidies to appease elite interests (Auty, 2004;
arl, 1997). These policies may, when resource prices fall, lead
o increased public sector borrowing and external debt. Others
ave found evidence to suggest the lack of growth in resource rich
ountries is due to the lack of transparency, an absence of demo-
ratic governance, and the prevalence of corruption (Acosta, 2013;
olstad & Wiig, 2009; Leite & Weidmann, 1999; Williams, 2011).
A relative abundance of natural resource rents may  lead to a frac-
ional or predatory government that distorts the economy in the
ursuit of rents (Auty, 2001). The presence of large resource endow-
ents may  decrease democratization (Aslaksen, 2010; Epstein,
ates, Goldstone, Kristensen, & O’Halloran, 2006; Ross, 2004). Large
esource endowments may  deteriorate contract enforcement and
nancial development in countries with inadequate political insti-
utions (Bhattacharyya & Roland, 2014). Elites, fearing loss of
ncumbency advantage, may  block political and technological inno-
ations and thus inhibit economic development. The likelihood
f blocking is higher in countries with significant resource rents
Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). Moreover, resource rich societies
re also more prone to experience civil wars (Collier et al., 2009;
earon & Laitin, 2003; Koubi, Spilker, Böhmelt, & Bernauer, 2014;
orelli & Rohner, 2015).1
We  note that these claims are disputed in the literature and that
 large resource endowment may  have a positive influence on eco-
omic growth (Alexeev & Conrad, 2009; Brunnschweiler & Bulte,
008). Evidence for the United States, for example, suggests that an
ncrease in natural resource revenues lowers non-resource taxes,
ncreases expenditure, and induces public savings (James, 2015).
he resource curse may  be an artifact of the relatively slow growth
f the natural resource sector to other sectors of the economy
James, 2015). Appropriately structured resource revenue shar-
ng structures across different levels of government may  promote
conomic development, reduce regional inequality, and alleviate
onflict. Yet, in many cases, these revenue sharing structures exac-
rbate political tensions, impede economic development, and, in
he worst cases, incentivize violent conflict (Bauer, Gankhuyag,
anley, Halling, & Venugopal, 2016).
1 Ross (2004) aptly summarizes the drivers of civil wars in resource rich coun-
ries: “By harming a country’s economic performance; by making its government
eaker, more corrupt, and less accountable; by giving people who  live in resource-
ich  regions an incentive to form an independent state; and by helping finance rebel
ovements.”f Economics and Finance 70 (2018) 52–61 53
Practitioners and policymakers alike have sought policy inter-
ventions to improve governance in resource rich countries. Fiscal
decentralization, or the delegation or devolution of revenues and
expenditures to subnational governments, is of specific interest
particularly to address the issue of regional incentives to form
independent states (Sambanis & Milanovic, 2014).2 More gen-
erally, decentralization should be considered a national strategy
pursued to make the public sector more efficient, effective, and
accountable to the needs and preferences of citizens (Oates, 2005;
Sepulveda & Martinez-Vazquez, 2011). Reforms promoting fiscal
decentralization have gained in popularity due to a wide range
of positive outcomes attributed to decentralization (Weingast,
2014). Decentralization may  improve allocative efficiency and
alter the composition of public expenditures (Arze del Granado,
Martinez-Vazquez, & McNab, 2016; Galasso & Ravallion, 2005).
Decentralization may  also improve economic efficiency, demo-
cratic governance, and economic growth (Arzaghi & Henderson,
2005; Martinez-Vazquez & McNab, 2003). Fiscal decentraliza-
tion may  also reduce the likelihood of civil wars (Ezcurra, 2015;
Sambanis & Milanovic, 2014), although this may  be conditional
on a society’s income level and ethnic composition (Bakke &
Wibbels, 2011; Tranchant, 2008). This effect appears to be more
pronounced in countries with relatively large resource endow-
ments (Farzanegan, Lessmann, & Markwardt, 2013).
Fiscal decentralization, however, appears to be dependent on
several factors, many of which are lacking in resource rich and
developing countries. The degree of fiscal decentralization appears
to be driven, in part, by economic, demographic, and environmental
conditions (Arzaghi & Henderson, 2005; Oates, 1972, 2005; Panizza,
1999). Decentralization requires coordination among different lev-
els of government; coordination that may  be lacking in developing
countries with weak institutional arrangements (de Mello, 2000).
In the Middle East and North Africa, external conflicts are a major
roadblock to fiscal decentralization (Tosun & Yilmaz, 2010). While
higher income per capita appears to induce fiscal decentralization,
this effect is reversed in developing countries (Bodman & Hodge,
2010) and with respect to health decentralization (Letelier, 2005).
Developing countries continue to have relatively low levels of fiscal
decentralization, suggesting that these countries struggle to imple-
ment proposed reforms (Gadenne & Singhal, 2013).
Fiscal decentralization may  be inhibited by rent-seeking behav-
ior in rentier regions (Desai, Freinkman, & Goldberg, 2005). The
existing evidence on the impacts of resource dependence on decen-
tralization rely on primarily country-specific evidence. Natural
resource endowments and transfer dependency also appear to limit
decentralization for the case of China (Stefan, 2013; Wu  & Wang,
2013) and Russia (Freinkman & Plekhanov, 2009). Countries with
higher levels of expenditure decentralization appear to be more
susceptible to the natural resource curse (Perez-Sebastian & Raveh,
2016a,b). It is thus reasonable to hypothesize that increased natural
resource endowments negatively affect a country’s fiscal decentral-
ization, a hypothesis that we  examine in the next section.
3. Data
A common problem in the cross-country study of expenditure
decentralization is how to measure decentralization. Ideally, we
would develop a set of measures of expenditure decentralization
that capture the decisions of central and subnational governments.
This dataset would quantify the degree of autonomy afforded
subnational governments, to include administrative, fiscal, and
2 We focus our efforts on fiscal decentralization. There is a large extant literature
on  political and administrative decentralization which is beyond the scope of the
paper.
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Table 1
Variables.
Variable Definition Units Source




Authors’ calculation and GFS
Ethnic  Fractionalization The index is equal to one is sum of the shares of
ethnolinguistic groups in a specific country
Fraction
[0,1]
Alesina et al. (2004)
Gross Domestic Product Per
Capita
Gross Domestic Product divided by total population Local currency
units
WDI
Gross  Capital Formation as
Percent of GDP
Consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the




Natural Resource Rents as
Percent of GDP
The ratio of total nature resources rents to GDP. Total natural
resources rents include the sum of oil, natural gas, coal,




OECD Dummy  Dummy  variable that is 1 for OECD members, 0 otherwise (0,1) Author’s Calculation
Openness to Trade The sum of exports to GDP and imports to GDP Fraction
[0,1]
Authors’ calculation and WDI
Regional Autonomy Index The Regional Authority Index is a measure of the authority of
regional governments in 81 countries on an annual basis
across ten dimensions: institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal
autonomy, borrowing autonomy, representation, law making,
executive control, fiscal control, borrowing control,
constitutional reform.
Hooghe et al. (2016)
Population Total population Millions WDI
Polity2 The POLITY score is computed by subtracting the Autocracy
score from the Democratic Score and ranges from +10
(strongly democratic) to −10 (strong autocratic). The resulting
score is then normalized to a 0 (strongly autocratic) to 1
Fraction
[0,1]



































Urban Population Percentage of the population living in urba
olitical autonomy. The dataset would also capture relations
etween and among different levels of government (Martinez-
azquez & McNab, 2003). While some advances have been made
egarding revenue decentralization for a number of OECD countries
Baskaran & Feld, 2013; Stegarescu, 2005, 2009), similar quality
and quantity) data are not readily available with regards to expen-
iture decentralization though this would be a welcome (though
rduous) area for future research.
To examine the question of whether natural resource rents influ-
nce expenditure decentralization across a sample of developed
nd developing countries, we (as with many other studies) are
eft with the standard though imperfect measure of expenditure
ecentralization based on expenditure ratio data. To construct this
easure, we use expenditures at the national and subnational gov-
rnment level from the International Monetary Fund’s Government
inance Statistics Annual Yearbook (GFS). To test the proposition that
atural resource rents influence expenditure decentralization, we
efine the dependent variable, Decent,  as the share of subnational
xpenditures in total public expenditures.
We use GFS data at the consolidated central government,
egional and state government, and local government levels. For
hose countries that do not report consolidated central government
ata, we substitute data for the budgetary central government. Of
he 180-plus potential countries in the GFS data set, we select coun-
ries that reported expenditures for at least the central government
nd at least one level of subnational government. We  do not adjust
ata for price or currency fluctuations. We  exclude those countries
ith less than four years of data.
We employ data using the 2001 GFS methodology as the IMF
as noted that the 1986 and 2001 methodology data are not
omparable.3 While some authors have attempted to construct a
ompatible series using both datasets, the resulting datasets are
3 We refer the reader to the 2015 IMF  Handbook for a discussion of the 1986 and
001 GFS methodologies. We also note that even though some 1986 methodology
ased data are available according to the 2001 GFS methodology, these data are cash
ased versus the accrual basis of the 2001 GFS methodology.as Fraction
[0,1]
WDI
subject to the authors’ assumptions regarding the comparability
of variables across methodologies (Arze del Granado et al., 2016;
Martinez-Vazquez & McNab, 2003). We  choose instead to limit our
analysis to the 2001 GFS methodology which limits our analysis to
1990 onwards.
For our independent variable of interest, rents, we  use the ratio
of total natural resource rents to GDP from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (WDI). Total natural resource rents include
the sum of oil, natural gas, coal, mineral, and forest rents. We
expect a priori that, all other things being equal, countries with
more abundant natural resources are less decentralized. To check
the robustness of our results, we employ a second independent
variable of interest, rents exp, which is the ratio of ores, metals, and
fuel exports as a share of total merchandise exports. We  obtain
this variable from the WDI. We  expect a priori that the ratio of
natural resource exports to total merchandise exports negatively
influences decentralization.
We define a matrix X of control variables which previous
research suggests are significant determinants of expenditure
decentralization including population, urban population as a
percentage of total population, GDP per capita, and openness
to international trade (Arzaghi & Henderson, 2005; Canavire-
Bacarreza, Martinez-Vazquez, & Yedgenov, 2016). We  include a
dummy variable to capture OECD membership status to capture dif-
ferences between developing and developed countries. We  obtain
these variables from the World Bank’s WDI, the POLITY IV database,
the Regional Autonomy Index, and Freedom House’s Freedom in the
World yearbook (Table 1). The period of analysis is from 1990 to
2012, although many countries in the sample report for fewer years
(Table 2). The resulting unbalanced panel dataset has 67 distinct
developed and developing countries with 996 observations.
We present descriptive statistics in Table 3. These descriptive
statistics show a wide variety of levels of decentralization and
resource dependence across countries. While urbanization and
democratization as well are relatively high on average, the sample
shows considerable variability across countries and time in these
variables as well.
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Table  2
Sample Countries.
Country Years Country Years
Afghanistan 2006–2012 Kyrgyzstan 1997–2001
2006–2012
Albania 1995–1998 Latvia 1995–2012
Argentina 1990–2004 Malaysia 1990–2001
Armenia 2003–2012 Mexico 1990–2000
Australia 1990–2012 Moldova 1995–2012
Austria 1990–2012 Mongolia 1992–2012
Azerbaijan 2008–2012 Morocco 2002–2012
Belgium 2000–2012 Netherlands 1990–2012
Bulgaria 1990–2012 New Zealand 2002–2012
Belarus 1992–2012 Norway 1990–2012
Bolivia 1990–2007 Panama 1990–1994
Canada 1990–2012 Paraguay 2005–2012
Chile 1992–2012 Peru 1990–2012




Costa Rica 2002–2012 Romania 1990–2012
Croatia 1995–2005 Russia 1994–1995
1998–2012







Estonia 1995–2012 South Korea 2007-2012
Finland 1990–2012 South Africa 1990-2012
France 1990–2012 Spain 1990–2012
Georgia 1998–2012 Sweden 1990–2012
Germany 1990–2012 Thailand 1990–2012
Greece 1995–2012 Tunisia 2008–2012
Honduras 2003–2012 Turkey 2008–2012
Hungary 1991–2012 Uganda 1998–2012




Ireland 1990–2012 United States 1990–2012










Italy 1995–2012 Zimbabwe 2001–2005
Kazakhstan 1995–2012
. Econometric approach
To test the proposition that an abundance of natural resources
eads to lower levels of expenditure decentralization, we  employ
anel data and specify the initial general estimation form:
ecenti,t =  ̨ + ˇ1Rentsi,t + ˇ2OECD + X′i,t + i + t + i,t (1)here i and t denote the unobservable individual country and





Age Dependency Ratio 1073 
Log  of Land Area 1073 
Expenditure Decentralization 1073 
Ethnic Fractionalization 765 
Log  of GDP per capita 1072 
Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP) 1067 
Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP) 1073 
Natural Resource Exports (% of Total
Merchandise Exports)
1028 
OECD Dummy  1073 
Openness to Trade (% of GDP) 1072 
Regional Authority Index 749 
Log  of Total Population 960 
Polity2 1016 
Urban Population 1073 f Economics and Finance 70 (2018) 52–61 55
We begin by examining whether the variables of interest exhibit
a unit root process as the presence of a unit root, unless N and T
grow quite large, is likely to induce inconsistent and biased esti-
mates (Baltagi, 2008). We conduct Fisher type unit root tests for
the dependent and independent variables (Maddala & Wu,  1999).
We reject the null hypothesis that all the panels exhibit a unit root
at the one percent level of significance for all the variables of inter-
est with the exception of natural resource exports as a percentage
of total merchandise exports and the variables associated with gov-
ernance: the POLITY IV index, the Regional Autonomy Index, and
the Freedom variable associated with the Freedom House’s indices
(Table 4). We are able to reject the null hypothesis at the one per-
cent level of significance for these variables in first differences.
We,  however, have an additional concern regarding the per-
sistence of the expenditure decentralization variable. If the
expenditure decentralization variable is highly persistent and the
sample size is relatively small, unit root tests have relatively low
power (Campbell & Perron, 1991). Even if the true process is highly
persistent yet stationary ( → 1), the best predictor of decentral-
ization in the current period may  be decentralization in the past
period. If expenditure decentralization is highly persistent, the
estimated standard errors may  be biased; potentially leading to
spurious conclusions. We  investigate the persistency by specifying
a general estimation form as
Decenti,t =  ̨ + ˇ1Decenti,t−1 + i + t + i,t (2)
We employ three estimators to examine the autoregressive
order 1, AR(1), properties of expenditure decentralization: (1) the
pooled OLS estimator; (2) the one-way fixed effects estimator; and
(3) the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)  estimator.
We  would expect, a priori, for the pooled OLS and fixed effects esti-
mators to provide the upper and lower bounds for the system GMM
estimator, respectively (Bond, 2002).
The results suggest that expenditure decentralization is indeed
highly persistent (Table 5). Depending on the estimator and
underlying assumptions, the estimated coefficient for lagged
decentralization approaches unity. This raises concerns that the
persistence of the dependent variable will render the estimators
inconsistent or, at a minimum, bias the standard errors and render
inferences unreliable. We  thus choose to estimate in first differ-
ences.
We employ four estimators to investigate whether natural
resource rents influence expenditure decentralization: a pooled
OLS estimator, a fixed-effects estimator, a system GMM  estima-
tor, and a Bias-Corrected Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDVC)
estimator. By estimating in first differences, we examine whether
a change in natural resource rents causes a change in expendi-
ture decentralization. This is a somewhat higher hurdle in terms of
Mean Std. Dev Min  Max
0.531 0.117 0.345 1.087
12.602 1.676 9.917 16.654
0.254 0.136 0.003 0.652
0.330 0.257 0.010 0.932
10.685 2.220 1.308 17.842
23.925 5.904 0.299 58.151
0.048 0.084 0.000 0.656
0.187 0.207 0.002 0.974
0.489 0.500 0.000 1.000
0.795 0.371 0.138 2.204
12.650 10.211 0.000 36.990
2.717 1.416 −1.289 7.124
0.884 0.215 0.150 1.000
0.670 0.167 0.119 0.977
56 L.E. Armey, R.M. McNab / The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 70 (2018) 52–61
Table 4
Fisher Type Unit-Root Tests.
Constant Constant and Trend Constant and 1 lag, ADF Constant and 1 lag, PP
Age Dependency Ratio 803.62** 138.06 288.15** 201.71**
Expenditure Decentralization 275.16** 391.63** 199.24** 292.46**
Log of GDP per capita 665.91** 322.44** 89.14 378.17**
Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP) 299.66** 303.23** 291.05** 380.41**
Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP) 411.40** 358.82** 202.73** 487.47**
Natural Resource Exports (% of Total
Merchandise Exports)
166.81** 140.28 124.93 167.01*
Openness to Trade (% of GDP) 230.81** 343.03** 168.89* 457.48**
Regional Authority Index 60.37 30.68 41.02 32.63
Log  of Total Population 1545.51** 641.89 1383.68** 576.67**
Polity2 51.15 36.07 95.48 39.26
Urban  Population 773.44** 515.52** 244.02** 412.80**
First difference of:
Natural Resource Exports 853.65** 821.62** 388.62** 881.48**
Regional Authority Index 407.84** 339.43** 173.40** 341.09**
Polity2 362.82** 264.17** 144.55+ 269.72**
Notes: The null hypothesis of the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Philipp-Perron (PP) test is that all panels exhibit a unit root. Based upon the p-values of the individual
panel  unit root tests, Fisher’s test assumes that all series are non-stationary under the null hypothesis against the alternative that at least one series in the panel is stationary.
Full  results available upon request. **,*,+ denote significance at the 1%,5%, and 10% level respectively.
Table 5
AR(1) Properties of Expenditure Decentralization.
(1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7)



























Observations 996 996 996 996 996 996
Adjusted R2 0.974 0.683 – – – –
M1  −0.877 99.560** −3.595** −3.622** −3.737** −3.817**
M2  0.665 – 1.287 1.290 1.297 1.297
Lag  Limits – – All 3 3 3
Number of
Instruments
– – 297 107 27 27
Collapsed – – No No Yes Yes
One  step or Two – – One One One Two
Hansen Test – – 50.049 48.420 0.073 0.073
Diff.  in Hansen
test
– – −0.000 −1.147 0.028 0.028
























ausality yet we believe that earlier studies that failed to account
or the persistence of the expenditure decentralization variable are,
t a minimum, suspect. As none of the variables exhibit a unit-root
n first differences, the general functional form for the static model
s:
Decenti,t =  ̨ + ˇ1Rentsi,t + ˇ2OECD + X′ i,t + i + t + i,t (3)
We also argue that a dynamic model may  be important to
llustrate the underlying macroeconomic processes in question.
hanges in decentralization in the current period may  be a func-
ion, in part, of changes in decentralization in the preceding period.
his approach allows us to compare the static and dynamic results.
e employ the following dynamic model to estimate the impact of
atural resource rents on expenditure decentralization:
Decenti,t =  ̨ + ˇ1Decenti,t−1 + ˇ2Rentsi,t−1 + X′ i,t−1 + i + t + i,t (4)
There are, in addition, several important tradeoffs in the types
f models used and how they are specified; we explain more about
he choices below..1. Generalized method of moments estimator
Two problems arise in the dynamic model. One is that the lagged
ependent variable is systematically correlated with the error term,the other, and this is common throughout the models, is that several
of the regressors, such as GDP per capita, may  be endogenous. We
employ a system GMM  estimator in both the static and dynamic
models in order to use lagged differences and lagged levels as
instruments for the lagged dependent variable and other endoge-
nous variables (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998). We
have choosen to use only internal instrumental variables. Impor-
tantly, GMM  estimators offer standard errors that are robust to
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
Researchers have several options available to them when using
GMM  estimators that incur important trade-offs (Bond, 2002;
Wooldridge, 2001). We  report the results of several specifications to
ensure robustness to specification choices (Roodman, 2009a). We
use the two-step process that is generally more efficient and natu-
rally resilient to heteroskedasticity. The two-step process, however,
tends to downward bias standard errors enough to make infer-
ence impossible when instrument counts are large (Arellano &
Bond, 1991). To counter this issue, we  employ the two-step pro-
cess with Windmeijer corrected standard errors which ameliorates
such problems (Windmeijer, 2005).
We further explore the sensitivity of our results to changes in the

























































L.E. Armey, R.M. McNab / The Quarterly Re
ariables and weaken Hansen tests. We  collapse the instrument
atrix and limit the number of lags to control for instrument pro-
iferation (Roodman, 2009b). We  assume that population, urban
opulation, and the time variables are exogenous variables. The
ther variables, including decentralization, natural resource rents,
DP per capita, openness to international trade, and freedom are
ssumed to be endogenous. In order to preserve the size of our
ataset, we employ forward orthogonal deviations using infor-
ation on future differences to instrument for past differences
Arellano & Bover, 1995).
.2. Bias-corrected least squares dummy variable estimator
This estimator has the potential to be more efficient and consis-
ent than the more common GMM  estimators. It is well known that
he least squares dummy  variable (LSDV) estimator is inconsistent
or dynamic panel data with relatively large N and finite T (Nickell,
981). With highly persistent data, first differenced GMM  estima-
ors may  suffer from small sample bias due to weak instruments,
specially with small N (Blundell & Bond, 1998). It is possible to
pproximate the small sample bias of the LSDV estimator when N
s relatively small (Bun & Kiviet, 2003; Kiviet, 1995). If N is relatively
mall, we would expect, a priori, for the LSDVC estimator to perform
s well as the system GMM  estimator with respect to mean absolute
ias and root mean squared error (Buddelmeyer, Jensen, Oguzoglu,
 Webster, 2008). Under the assumptions of strict exogeneity and
mall N, the Bias-Corrected Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDVC)
stimator obtains a bias approximation and corrects the estimates
o the estimates are consistent and efficient relative to the Instru-
ental Variables (IV) and GMM  estimators (Bruno, 2005a,b).
As with the system GMM  estimator, researchers have several
mportant choices with regards to the LSDVC estimator. Given that
he number of countries in our sample is 67, we believe that N is
ufficiently small to warrant the use of the LSDVC estimator. We
hoose to initialize the LSDVC estimators with the Anderson-Hsiao





.5 As the estimated asymptotic standard errors
ay  have poor approximation in small samples, we  tested the sta-
istical significance of the LSDVC coefficients with bootstrapped
tandard errors (Bruno, 2005b).
. Results
We  find empirical evidence that natural resource rents nega-
ively and significantly affect expenditure decentralization. This
esult is robust in the static estimators but fragile to the choice
f estimator in the dynamic estimations. The results suggest that,
or the sample countries and time periods, that increases in natural
esource endowments and associated rents lead to decreases in the
ecentralization of government expenditures.
We  first examine the static bivariate relationship between
atural resource rents as a percentage of GDP and expenditure
ecentralization (Table 6). We  note, with one exception (Model
2), that the estimated coefficient for natural resource rents is neg-
tive and statistically significant at the 10% level. An increase in
ents of 1% results in an approximate 0.1% decline in expenditure
4 We also examined whether initializing with the Arellano-Bond or Blundell-
ond estimates would alter our estimates. There was not a significant change. These
stimates are available upon request.
5 We examined whether less accurate approximations of the bias, to include
(1/T) and O(1/NT) altered the significance of the estimated coefficient for natural
esources. While, as one might expect, the estimated coefficient changed slightly in
esponse to the bias approximation, the sign and significance of the estimated coef-
cients for natural resources did not change. These estimates are available upon
equest.f Economics and Finance 70 (2018) 52–61 57
decentralization. We  argue that these results are strongly sugges-
tive of a relationship between natural resources and expenditure
decentralization.
Turning to the full static estimations, we  find evidence that nat-
ural resource rents negatively and significantly affect expenditure
decentralization (Table 7). As with the bivariate estimations, a 1%
increase in natural resource rents is associated with a 0.1% decrease
in expenditure decentralization. This result is robust to different
specifications of the system GMM  estimator, to include changes in
lag length, one-step or two-step estimates, and corrections to the
standard errors.6 The static results are indicative of a relationship
between natural resource rents and expenditure decentralization.
These reported estimates, however, are based on static esti-
mators. It is possible that previous changes in expenditure
decentralization affect current changes in expenditure decentral-
ization. Table 8 provides evidence to support our argument. The
estimated coefficient for the lagged first difference of expendi-
ture decentralization is positive and statistically significant across
specifications of the LSDVC estimator though it is statistically
insignificant in the system-GMM models.
In the dynamic LSDVC models, using different sets of control
variables, we find that natural resources rents consistently sig-
nificantly and negatively impact decentralization. However, the
estimated coefficient for natural resources appears to be fragile to
the set of control variables (which in turn influences the available
sample) in the system GMM  estimator, possibly due to the previ-
ously discussed finite sample bias. In the dynamic specifications,
we find that a 1% change in natural resource rents results in an
approximate 0.1% to 0.2% change in expenditure decentralization.
We do note that the estimated coefficient for natural resource rents
appears to be fragile to the choice of governance indicator.
Next, we  examine whether our results are fragile to the choice
of measure of natural resource endowments. We  utilize the WDI’s
measures of ores, metals, and fuel exports as a percentage of total
merchandise exports to test the robustness of our previous conclu-
sions. Given the potential finite sample bias of the system GMM
estimator, here we  rely solely on the LSDVC estimator. We  first
examine whether there is evidence of a bivariate relationship using
dynamic models. We  find evidence to suggest that a 1% change in
the natural resource exports as a percentage of total merchandise
exports results in an approximate 0.1% to 0.2% decrease in expen-
diture decentralization (Table 9). Turning to the full specifications,
we find a similar result (Table 10), leading us to conclude that our
results are robust to changes in the measure of natural resource
endowments.
Finally, unlike much of the previous literature on the determi-
nants of decentralization, we employ analysis in first differences
and examine dynamic models. In so doing, we find some evidence
that changes in the common control variables influence decentral-
ization. Only gross capital formation is consistently significant and
positive. It is significant and positive at the 5% level in one of the
two static system-GMM models that include it (Table 7). Turning to
dynamic models (Table 8), in the three LSDVC models, gross capital
formation is significant at least the 5% level, and in the system GMM
models it is significant at the 1% level in one model, the 10% level
in another, and insignificant in a third. Population is insignificant
across specifications, and urban population is significant at the 5%
level in one system GMM  specification. Similarly, GDP per capita
is statistically significant and positive in one static system GMM
model (5% level), one dynamic System GMM  model (10% level).
GDP per capita is statistically significant and positive in four out of
the five models (two at the 5% level and two  at the 1% level) with
6 Additional estimates are available upon request.
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Table 6
Expenditure Decentralization on Natural Resource Rents in First Differences.
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
OLS  Fixed Effects System GMM  System GMM  System GMM  System GMM
Natural
Resource Rents













Observations 996 996 996 996 996 996
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.025 – – – –
M1  −0.737 0.000 −3.704** −3.692** −3.587** −3.583**
M2  0.718 – 1.265 1.233 1.225 1.107
Lag  Limits – – All 3 3 3
Number of
Instruments
– – 317 127 48 49
Collapsed – – No No Yes Yes
One  step or Two – – Two  Two Two Two
Orthogonal – – No No No Yes
Hansen Test – – 46.492 44.942 18.594 29.465
Diff.  in Hansen
test
– – −1.893 4.140 0.000 1.963
Table 7
Expenditure Decentralization on Natural Resource Rents in First Differences.
(14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)





















































































































Observations 890 890 890 890 863 863 654
M1  0.294 0.001 −3.384** −3.394** −4.218** −4.188** −3.544**
M2  0.559 – 0.594 0.590 −0.738 −0.808 0.100
Number of
Instruments
– – 55.000 59.000 63.000 67.000 69.000
Hansen Test – – 34.010 35.431 29.872 26.707 9.330

















otes: All system GMM  estimators have collapsed instruments, orthogonal instrum
rade in resources instead of resource rents. Openness to trade is
egative and significant in only one model. While the POLITY mea-
ure of governance is not statistically significant, we  find evidence
o suggest that a measure of regional autonomy is significant in the
SDVC estimations. This result suggests that regional autonomy,
ot the overall level of democratization, may  play a greater role in
he determination of expenditure decentralization.
One possibility for the fragility of the control variables is that
he previously determined statistical significance is appropriate in
evels and not appropriate in first differences.7 Another possibility
s that our results with system GMM  estimator suffer from small
7 We also explored whether corruption and inequality influenced expenditure
ecentralization. Inequality not reduced the sample by approximately half and did
ot yield significant results. We also examined whether the ICRG’s measure of cor-
uption would alter our results. While the sample size fell by approximately 200
bservations, the statistical significance of natural resource rents increased andnd use the two-step estimator for the standard errors.
sample bias and that the LSDVC estimator is most appropriate. GDP
per capita, for example, is statistically significant in all but one of
the LSDVC estimations, echoing previous findings that the level of
development influences expenditure decentralization. Given that
we have found that changes in natural resource rents influence
changes in expenditure decentralization across different estima-
tors, we  have a high level of confidence in this result. We  argue
that these results offer strong support for the proposition that nat-
ural resource endowments reduce expenditure decentralization in
the sample countries.GDP per capita was  also significant using the LSDVC estimator. These estimates are
available upon request.
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Table  8
Expenditure Decentralization and Natural Resources in First Differences Dynamic Estimation.
(21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28)













































































































Observations 921 921 822 822 819 647 795 795
Notes: All system GMM  estimators have three lags, collapsed instruments, orthogonal instruments, and use the two-step estimator for the standard errors. Standard errors
in  parentheses.
+ p < 0.10.
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
Table 9
Expenditure Decentralization and Natural Resources Exports First Differences.




























Observations 888 888 888 888
Adjusted R2 0.022 −0.653
Notes: See Table 8.
Table 10
Expenditure Decentralization and Natural Resources Exports in First Differences Bias-Corrected Least Squares Dummy Variable Estimator.



























































































Observations 888 798 798 795 637 771
Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.10.
* p < 0.05.
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. Conclusions
This paper set out to suggest a test of whether natural resource
ents is a determinant of expenditure decentralization. Much of
he literature suggests that an increase in rents is negatively asso-
iated with revenue decentralization, however, there is a paucity of
ross-country evidence of the influence of natural resource rents on
xpenditure decentralization. If revenues do stick where they land,
hen one might reasonably expenditure that expenditure assign-
ents and levels would change a result.
We  set ourselves the difficult task of determining whether
hanges in resource dependence induce changes in expenditure
ecentralization, a somewhat higher hurdle than previous studies
hat examine whether levels of resource dependence are associated
ith levels of fiscal decentralization. Using multiple estimators and
pecifications, our empirical analysis supports the contention that
ncreases in resource rents reduce expenditure decentralization
or the sample countries. These results echo early findings in the
iterature with regards to China, Peru, and Russia (Freinkman &
lekhanov, 2009; Loayza, Rigolini, & Calvo-Gonzalez, 2014; Stefan,
013; Wu & Wang, 2013).8 Our results are robust to an alternative
easure of resource dependence: resource exports.
This paper additionally presents a rigorous empirical examina-
ion of the dynamics of expenditure decentralization. We  illustrate
he persistence of expenditure decentralization and compare the
esults of static and dynamic models. While many cross-country
eterminants are well established in the literature (Arzaghi &
enderson, 2005; Canavire-Bacarreza et al., 2016), first differences
ome of these control variables do not appear to impact first dif-
erences in expenditure decentralization. Gross capital formation
oes appear to enhance expenditure decentralization consistently
nd positively. This echoes the fragility of many determinants of
conomic growth when investment is included in the growth equa-
ion (Levine & Renelt, 1992). To the extent that capital formation is
 driver of economic development, our finding fits the general story
hat development enhances demand for decentralization which, in
urn, leads to more responsive public goods provision.9
We  also note that there are other potential drivers of expen-
iture decentralization. Our results suggest that if the natural
esource rents increase by 1% from the previous period then,
fter accounting for the persistency of expenditure decentral-
zation, expenditure decentralization decreases by approximately
.1% from the previous period for the sample countries. Some may
nd this effect relatively small, however, it is robust and implies
hat other determinants may  be in play. Other potential factors,
ncluding macroeconomic and demographic variables, may  have a
tatistically larger impact on expenditure decentralization (Sacchi
 Salotti, 2016). Our empirical approach, however, suggests that
uture studies need to account for the dynamic nature of decen-
ralization. We  also believe it would be appropriate to apply this
pproach to question of whether natural resource revenues are
sticky’ (Perez-Sebastian & Raveh, 2016a,b).
With respect to future research, we note that natural resource
ents is an aggregate measure, combining rents from oil, natu-
al gas, minerals, forests, and other resources. The type of natural
esource may  affect expenditure decentralization; a hypothesis
hat should be of interest to policymakers and practitioners alike
Alexeev & Conrad, 2009; Bauer et al., 2016). We  also note that
8 An interesting line of research would be to examine whether decentraliza-
ion  affects different types of expenditure (operational and capital). While natural
esource revenues appear to negative impact operational expenditure in Peru, these
evenues appear to increase capital expenditure (Loayza et al., 2014)
9 This is not a recent argument as a high rate of capital formation is required if
utput growth is to accelerate (Solow, 1962).f Economics and Finance 70 (2018) 52–61
expenditure decentralization (or recentralization) is likely to affect
the composition of public expenditures (Arze del Granado et al.,
2016). Examining how governments change the composition of
public expenditures in response to changes in natural resource
rents should be of great interest to those designing and implement-
ing decentralization reforms. Furthermore, we believe it would be
fruitful to build upon the question of whether sectoral heterogene-
ity influences the finding (or lack of a finding) of a resource curse
(James, 2015). Examining whether sectoral heterogeneity influ-
ences expenditure decentralization may  provide insight into why
decentralization moves forward in some countries and appears to
stall in others.
Improved allocative efficiency, accountability in public goods
distribution, enhanced economic growth, avoidance of civil war:
these are elusive goals for resource rich countries. While increased
decentralization may ameliorate, to some extent, these outcomes,
it appears that natural resource abundance decreases expendi-
ture decentralization. It appears that expenditure decentralization
is more difficult in natural resource abundant countries and this
presents an additional challenge to implementing decentralization
reforms in these countries.
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